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Some weeks have passed since the European Court of Justice delivered its startling
binding Opinion 2/13 against the accession of the European Union to the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). There has already been much academic
commentary on the complex Opinion. The European Commission has declared
the need for a period of reflection. Mindful of its legal duty under Article 6(2) TEU
to achieve the EU’s accession to the Convention, the Commission considers itself
still empowered by the Council decision of June 2010 to continue negotiations in
due course with the Council of Europe. But the political reaction is muted: some EU
member states would like to knock the matter into the long grass; and the European
Parliament has not yet found its voice. In truth, nobody can relish the thought of
re-opening negotiations at this juncture on the Draft Accession Agreement (DAA)
with either Russia or Turkey, both of whose leaders appear to have abandoned the
democratic rule of law and turned against Western values.
Yet the Court of Justice (CJEU) raises important issues which the other institutions
cannot simply ignore. Its Opinion adds to the already fairly improbable conditions
which the Treaties themselves attach to the EU’s accession to the ECHR: Protocol
No 8 says that accession shall not affect the ‘specific characteristics of the Union
and Union law’, that the competences of the EU and the powers of its institutions
shall be preserved, that the situation of member states vis-à-vis the ECHR should
not be changed, and further, that no intra-EU dispute should go to the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Article 52 of the Charter says that where its
provisions correspond to the ECHR their ‘meaning and scope … shall be the same’;
while Article 53 denies that the Charter restricts or adversely affects rights ‘as
recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international
law’ – notably the ECHR. Whereas Articles 53 (coincidentally) of both the ECHR
and the Charter allow their signatories to offer more extensive protection than
the Convention, the CJEU has been anxious to insist that after accession the EU
member states should not seek to outpace or undermine the ‘primacy, unity and
effectiveness’ of Union law.
Read it again
So what should be done? After first reactions have passed, one should read the
Opinion again, and from a number of different angles. Although there may be some
limited room for manoeuvre in tweaking the DAA on marginal issues, accession
will remain blocked until something substantive happens. The Opinion is the latest
manifestation of the historic tension in post-war Europe between federal and
international law. This is important unfinished business. Nobody can be complacent
about the opening up of a gap between the human rights regime of the Council of
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Europe and the fundamental rights regime of the European Union. A fall-out between
the ECtHR at Strasbourg and the CJEU at Luxembourg is a bad thing for European
rights protection.
And it comes at a difficult time. There is already a constitutional furore between
nationalists and federalists about the state-like qualities of the EU – and, more
pertinently, about how much more state-like the EU should become. The Opinion
comes at the very start of the next phase of the EU’s constitutional development,
challenging the outcome of both the Convention on the Charter of Fundamental
Rights (1999-2000) and the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-03). Those
of us involved in those Conventions recall very clearly how the decision to accede
to the ECHR became the quid pro quo for making the Charter binding: failure to
complete the process will inevitably weaken the force of the Charter.
So while it goes reflecting, the Commission would do well to remind everyone of the
original purpose of accession to the Convention, which is to permit the European
Union to develop superior rights jurisprudence of a constitutional type. Closing the
circle between the Convention and Charter systems should allow the EU to achieve
the best global standard in rights protection and remedial action. That is the name of
the game.
The need for internal rules
One of the odd things about this story so far is that the EU executive has yet to
agree its internal rules for managing affairs after accession. The main problem is
that the usual suspects in the Council are resisting the aggrandisement (as they see
it) of the role of the European Commission in the Council of Europe’s Committee of
Ministers. Federalists (of whom I am one) are concerned lest the Community method
is undermined in this relatively novel strategic field of European integration. Much
rests on the quality and clarity of these internal rules. Both the European Parliament,
which has to give its consent to the terms of the accession (Article 218(6) TFEU),
and the CJEU, which will surely have to be asked for a second Opinion on a revised
package deal (Article 218(11)), would be enlightened by the publication of agreed
internal rules.
For example, could the internal rules help to settle the thorny matter of the ECHR’s
new Protocol 16? This yet-to-be-ratified Protocol would allow its signatory states to
refer to the ECtHR for advice. Understandably, the CJEU is worried that this avenue
will be used by errant EU states to second-guess its own due process of preliminary
rulings under Article 267 TFEU. A good internal rule would discourage member
states from indulging in Protocol 16.
Another internal rule could pre-empt as far as possible interference by the ECtHR
from choosing co-respondents in a case brought before it by a non-EU state or
another entity on a matter leaning on EU law. It can be well understood that the
CJEU, while accepting the ECtHR as its external supervisor, should wish to prevent
its own subordination to the ECtHR. Such an assertion of its own powers within the
context of the EU’s conferred competences would strengthen the CJEU in its polite
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but determined struggle for supremacy over the national constitutional courts of EU
member states.
The general rule should be established that EU states go in the first instance to
Luxembourg about the Convention and should never go to Strasbourg about the
Charter. In all circumstances, to maintain the autonomy of the EU’s legal order, the
prior involvement of the CJEU should be guaranteed. Advocate General Kokott
recommended that the EU states make a self-denying ordinance against using
Article 33 ECHR to settle their disputes, but instead stick to EU arbitration (as Article
344 TFEU requires).
However, it will be worth examining the possibility of bolstering such a unilateral
declaration and the new rules of procedure in the form of a regulation under Article
352 TFEU.
The inevitability of treaty change
For the politicians among us (of whom I am one) the additional question arises of
whether the Treaties can be amended in order to lower the numerous hurdles that
have to be jumped before accession to the ECHR can be realised. The prospect
of treaty change is not shocking: come accession, the horizontal articles of the
Charter and Protocol No 8 will have to be modified or suppressed in any case. And
treaty change for other reasons – notably fiscal union – is just around the corner
regardless.
One element which aggravates us politicians is the doctrine of ‘mutual trust’ which
the CJEU insists prevails and must prevail between member states on the matter of
rights. Such a doctrinal approach seems increasingly out of kilter with political reality,
especially on asylum and immigration issues where there is plenty of evidence
of systemic deficiencies in many member states. The growing constitutional
interdependence of EU states is apparent in several fields. This mutual reliance
deserves to be underpinned in the EU treaty with a new clause that obliges the EU
states, especially when they change their domestic constitutions, to respect the
norms of the European Union. Such a provision would fall naturally within Article
4 TEU where the EU is already obliged to respect the domestic constitutions of its
states: that compliment now needs to be returned.
Equally, in order to make the concept of EU citizenship more real and to reinforce
freedom of movement, an enhancement of Articles 20-23 TFEU would seem a
reasonable proposition at a time when the Commission and the legislators seem to
be ready to extend ‘mutual trust’ wider from the civil law into the criminal law field.
Lastly, there is the enormous difficulty presented by the fact that Articles 24(1) TEU
and 275 TFEU severely restrict the powers of the CJEU to oversee the common
foreign and security policy of the Union. The CJEU quite understandably warns of
the risk that after accession the ECtHR would be able to trump EU law in this area
while only member states and not the CJEU itself would be able to intervene at
Strasbourg. Such a lacuna in the current EU Treaties matters very much because
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breaches of human and fundamental rights are likely to emerge precisely in the
context of the external activities of the EU, including common security and defence
policy missions, as well as over the EU’s dealings with third country nationals. We
knew this to be the case in the Convention: it is surely now time to rectify the earlier
mistake.
Conclusions
In summary, read Opinion 2/13 again. It deals with matters which go to the heart of
present battles between nationalism and federalism. There is no room for apathy
because a failure by the EU to accede to the ECHR would weaken rights protection
in Europe and elsewhere. The European Commission should remind us of this.
It is not opportune to renegotiate the DAA from scratch. Instead, the Commission,
backed more vigorously by the European Parliament, should press the Council to
settle their tedious arguments over the EU’s internal rules. Such rules should include
procedures to protect the autonomy of EU law and the prerogatives of the Court
of Justice in respect of preliminary rulings, prior involvement and co-respondency.
Secondary legislation to codify these procedures should be considered.
The resolution of the issues raised in Opinion 2/13 should be used to strengthen
the case for an early revision of the Treaties. Added to the agenda of the EU’s
third Convention should be the clarification of the doctrine of mutual trust, the
strengthening of the constitutional identity of the Union, the consolidation of citizens’
rights with regard to freedom of movement, and the widening of the jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice in the fields of foreign policy, security and defence.
And the judges of Luxembourg and Strasbourg should get to meet up more often.
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